In acquiring number words, children exhibit a qualitative leap in which they transition from understanding a few number words, to possessing a rich system of interrelated numerical concepts. We present a computational framework for understanding this inductive leap as the consequence of statistical inference over a sufficiently powerful representational system. We provide an implemented model that is powerful enough to learn number word meanings and other related conceptual systems from naturalistic data. The model shows that bootstrapping can be made computationally and philosophically wellfounded as a theory of number learning. Our approach demonstrates how learners may combine core cognitive operations to build sophisticated representations during the course of development, and how this process explains observed developmental patterns in number word learning.
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Introduction
''We used to think that if we knew one, we knew two, because one and one are two. We are finding that we must learn a great deal more about 'and'.'' [Sir Arthur Eddington]
Cognitive development is most remarkable where children appear to acquire genuinely novel concepts. One particularly interesting example of this is the acquisition of number words. Children initially learn the count list ''one'', ''two'', ''three'', up to ''six'' or higher, without knowing the exact numerical meaning of these words (Fuson, 1988) . They then progress through several subset-knower levels, successively learning the meaning of ''one'', ''two'', ''three'' and sometimes ''four'' (Lee & Sarnecka, 2010a , 2010b Sarnecka & Lee, 2009; Wynn, 1990 Wynn, , 1992 . Twoknowers, for example, can successfully give one or two objects when asked, but when asked for three or more will simply give a handful of objects, even though they can recite much more of the count list.
After spending roughly a year learning the meanings of the first three or four words, children make an extraordinary conceptual leap. Rather than successively learning the remaining number words on the count list-up to infinity-children at about age 3;6 suddenly infer all of their meanings at once. In doing so, they become cardinal-principal (CP) knowers, and their numerical understanding changes fundamentally (Wynn, 1990 (Wynn, , 1992 . This development is remarkable because CP-knowers discover the abstract relationship between their counting routine and number-word meanings: they know how to count and how their list of counting words relates to numerical meaning. This learning pattern cannot be captured by simple statistical or associationist learning models which only track co-occurrences between number words and sets of objects. Under these models, one would expect that number words would continue to be acquired gradually, not suddenly as a coherent conceptual system. Rapid change seems to require a learning mechanism which comes to
